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Abstract 
This paper advocates changes in the corporate governance of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to 
reflect the decline in tariffs and other border restraints to commerce and the emerging challenges of 
advancing freer trade and better regulation cooperation in a world economy dominated by global value 
chains. Together, these changes form an integration strategy that we refer to as the new WTO Think. 
This strategy remains rooted in the original rationale of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) of reducing the negative externalities of unilateral action and solving important international 
coordination challenges, but is more inclusive of regulators and non-state actors and more flexible and 
positive in its means. In particular, we advocate that the WTO should embrace the confluence of 
shared social preferences and trade, where it exists, as a motivation for advancing international 
regulatory cooperation. The WTO should also multilateralize the important regulatory cooperation 
occurring in smaller clubs of like-minded countries and better facilitate the use of plurilateral 
agreements where consensus across all WTO members is not yet possible. 
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 1 
Introductory Remarks* 
Understanding that there are important gains to be had from international cooperation does not itself 
ensure that cooperative behavior will emerge. This was one of the lessons of trade in the interwar 
period, when governments were unable through proclamations and solo measures alone to arrest the 
cycle of retaliation that followed the U.S. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, resulting in tariff levels 
of nearly 50 percent among the major powers. That experience led to the negotiation of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Its rationale—or GATT-think—was that reciprocal 
liberalization would curb unilateral protection and the negative externalities that result from 
uncoordinated and non-transparent actions in a trading system with many partners (Bagwell and 
Staiger, 2002). 
GATT-think succeeded beyond any reasonable expectation. This rules-based global trading system 
helped reduce tariffs and other border restraints and institutionalized global economic integration as a 
force for peace and prosperity. The average level of tariffs for OECD member countries fell to 3 
percent; the average applied tariff in emerging economies like China and India is less than 10 percent 
(World Trade Organization, 2014). Membership in the GATT and its successor institution, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), grew from 23 countries in 1947 to 164 nations today.
1
 Trade liberalization 
and increased global economic integration, in the mind of some experts, have contributed to other 
important gains as well: fewer wars and improved living standards in most nations of the world.
2
  
As a result of GATT’s success and drastically reduced tariffs, the way the world trades has changed 
in recent decades. The relative importance of regulations and standards as determinants of market 
access grew. That importance has only increased with the subsequent disciplining of other border 
restraints on trade through the WTO Agreements on Customs Valuation, Import Licensing, and, more 
recently, on Trade Facilitation. At the same time, greater global economic integration, 
democratization, rising living standards, and increased awareness of risks have increased the demand 
for more regulations and rules, as means of preserving and advancing social preferences on matters 
such as worker, environmental, and public health protection.
3
 More trade occurs now via global value 
chains (GVCs), which rely on consistent, efficient, and adequate regulatory oversight to function.
4
 The 
challenge of organizing consistent regulations is likely to grow with more products integrating value-
added services and cross-border data flows—areas in which the WTO trade disciplines are few. 
The global trading system has not adapted to these changes. The WTO still hews to the negative 
integration strategy of the GATT on regulations and social preferences, geared toward preventing 
domestic policies from being used to erode tariff concessions. This approach helped reduce explicitly 
protectionist regulations, but has done little to improve the international regulatory cooperation that is 
increasingly critical to freer trade. In the absence of that progress, countries are turning to bilateral and 
regional trade agreements to deepen their integration on regulatory matters. Businesses and consumers 
are relying on private or non-profit organization standards and third-party certifications to enforce 
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 “Accessions: Afghanistan to Become 164th WTO Member on 29 July 2016.” World Trade Organization, 29 June 2016.  
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 Pinker (2011); Radelet (2015). Irwin et al. (2008). Cordell Hull, one of the architects of the GATT trading regime, was 
awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace for his contributions. 
3
 In this piece, we define social preferences as fundamental interests that are not necessarily limited to a particular state. 
That definition distinguishes social preferences, which may transcend national boundaries, from the domestic policies of 
nation states or the transient negotiating demands, foreign policy goals, or bargaining positions that those states use to 
conduct foreign affairs. This definition draws loosely from the notion of preferences in Moravcsik (1997).  
4
 Michael Porter popularized the value chain concept. His underlying notion was that a firm should focus on the stages and 
support functions in which that firm has a comparative advantage and outsource the rest (Porter, 1985).  
Thomas J. Bollyky and Petros C. Mavroidis 
2 
social preferences and quality requirements. The resulting cacophony of rules and private standards 
has increased compliance costs and undermined effective international regulatory oversight. Popular 
support for liberalization of trade is already diminishing in many countries; that decline may accelerate 
without efforts to ensure that more trade also means better public health and a more protected 
environment.  
We should not need to relearn the lesson of the inter-war era that unnecessary harm can result from 
uncoordinated and non-transparent actions in a global trading system with many partners and no 
strong institutional support. More international cooperation would improve the consistency, efficiency, 
and adequacy of regulations, which is in the mutual interest of trade officials and regulators alike. 
This, however, does not mean more international regulatory cooperation will spontaneously occur.  
Here, WTO has an important role to play. Regulatory agencies are domestic in their orientation and 
their international cooperation initiatives often lack the funding, high-level political support, and 
urgency that trade negotiations can provide. Bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs) are advancing international regulatory cooperation beyond disciplines on nondiscrimination, 
but most exclude many of the lower-income nations engaged in GVCs. While developing countries 
have been able to reducing tariffs unilaterally to better compete in a world economy dominated by 
GVCs, the options for doing so in the regulatory context are limited. Pursuing international regulatory 
cooperation on a multilateral basis and within WTO avoids the need for multiple, parallel cooperation 
initiatives between the various sets of regulatory agency counterparts and trading partners involved in 
a GVC. It also takes advantage of the emphasis on rules-based, nondiscriminatory trade and process 
for regulatory convergence, albeit rudimentary, that already exist at the WTO. 
To advance this cause, we need a new WTO-think, a strategy that is better suited to the present 
challenges of the global economy. This strategy remains rooted in the original rationale of the GATT 
of reducing the negative externalities of unilateral action and solving important international 
coordination challenges, but is more inclusive of regulators and non-state actors and more flexible and 
positive in its means. To do this, we advocate that the WTO should embrace the confluence of shared 
social preferences and trade, where it exists, as a motivation for advancing international regulatory 
cooperation. We also recommend that the WTO rethink its corporate governance along the lines of 
variable geometry, an idea outlined in Lawrence (2006) and Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015). Building 
on that work, we develop a workable mechanism for multilateralizing the progress being made on 
regulatory cooperation initiatives at the sub-WTO level. We also propose changes to WTO rules to 
facilitate the use of plurilateral agreements where consensus across members is not yet possible. 
1. GATT-Think 
Why do we need multilateral trade agreements? There are sizable benefits to eliminating protectionist 
policies, irrespective of whether other nations do the same. For this reason, some economists have 
characterized the multilateral trade system as enlightened mercantilism, a framework of rules and 
reciprocal liberalization that create political tradeoffs and domestic lobbies for making the tariff 
reductions that governments should already do for economic reasons (Krugman, 1991, 1997).
5
 
We characterize the purpose of the GATT—GATT-think—differently. There are good arguments 
why some nations might want to protect.
6
 Proponents of the terms of trade theory would suggest that 
those who have the bargaining power to do so can profit from imposing tariffs that reduce the world 
                                                     
5
 In other words, the prospect of tariff reductions in other nations helps generate enough support from export-minded 
interests to overcome the opposition of domestic interests opposed to lower tariffs and the possibility of increased 
imports.  
6
 Regan (2006) (including revenue-raising, socially valued redistribution, and correcting externalities, including those 
affecting infant industries, as among the ‘perfectly proper’ goals for protection). 
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price to their advantage.
7
 Economic history on the other hand, is full of examples of tariff impositions 
for various reasons.
8
 Absent international agreement, (some) nations might have little incentive to 
eliminate protection. Further, there are virtues of international agreements beyond the creation of 
political tradeoffs and domestic lobbies for lower tariffs. Rules-based, reciprocal liberalization 
provides predictability, prevents backsliding, and creates forward momentum for deeper economic 
integration. By drawing more countries into a rules based system, multilateral trade agreements create 
static and dynamic efficiencies of scale. 
The genius of the GATT lies with its approach to disciplining protection. Instead of seeking to 
define and prohibit protectionism in all its potential forms, the GATT channels protectionism from 
outright import quotas (which it outlaws per se) toward a less pernicious and more transparent form of 
protection (tariffs) and making it negotiable.
9
 Once bound, tariff levels may only decrease. The 
requirement for nondiscriminatory application of domestic (‘behind the border’) policies was an 
insurance policy intended to prevent avoid the use of regulatory measures to replace, and thereby 
erode, tariff concessions. Having the outcome of tariff negotiation extend to all GATT members on a 
non-discriminatory basis created a powerful incentive for other nations to participate in the system. 
Enforceable dispute resolution kept them following the rules. So if negotiations persisted and 
succeeded, protection would gradually become extinct. Or, at least, this was the idea.
10
  
The GATT is concerned primarily with disciplining the unilateral imposition of border instruments, 
policies that affect only imports. Accordingly, the GATT requires import and export quotas to be 
abolished with immediate effect, capping tariffs (to restrain volatility, and the resulting uncertainty), 
and applying tariffs, in principle, in a nondiscriminatory and transparent way.
11
 The negotiators were 
determined to avoid a repeat of the escalating tariffs and trade wars that had characterized the interwar 
period. Tariffs levels had receded some by the time that GATT negotiations began, but the average 
tariff was still 22 percent in 1947 (Bown & Irwin, 2016).  
The intent of the GATT framers was to reduce negative externalities that may result from 
uncoordinated and non-transparent use of protectionist measures in a trading system with many 
partners. The limited rules on regulations and other nontariff measures that exist in the GATT play a 
supporting role in that effort. The framers were well aware of the risk of policy substitution in this 
arrangement, for some of the brightest minds of that generation participated in the negotiation of the 
GATT.
12
 Thus, commitments on domestic policies were necessary; otherwise the value of tariff 
bindings would be easily eroded. What does it mean to bind customs duties, if domestic taxes (to 
consumers) and subsidies (to producers) are left unconstrained? The discipline on domestic policies 
however, was softer. Those adhering to the GATT had to promise to place domestic and imported 
competing goods at equal footing. Nondiscrimination was thought to be an adequate insurance policy 
                                                     
7
 Johnson (1953-54); Bagwell and Staiger (2002). 
8
 An extreme example is the US Morrill Tariff (1861). This tariff sharply raised duties in order to raise revenue for the 
upcoming war in the United States. 
9
 There remains no operational definition of protectionism in international law. 
10
 The GATT discipline is discussed in detail in Jackson (1969), and Baldwin (1971). Mavroidis (2016) adds the case law 
during the GATT and the WTO years. The GATT-think did not totally solve the problem of defining “protection”. It 
requested from judges (panels) to come up with a workable definition every time they would be asked to pronounce 
whether domestic policies had been applied in nondiscriminatory (e.g., nonprotectionist) manner. Alas, this is an area 
where panels did not manage to rise to the challenge (Mavroidis, 2016). 
11
 Irwin (2015) explains why the fight against the UK imperial preferences was a major target of the US negotiators. The 
US victory would only come a few dozens years later. 
12
 Irwin et al. (2008). 
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against erosion of the value of tariff bindings.
13
 Tariffs, a negotiable instrument, remained as the only 
permitted means to protect domestic producers.  
1.1 Neutral Tariff Classifications  
Through the GATT, tariff levels were reduced through reciprocal negotiations. To facilitate this tariff 
negotiation, a common description of goods for tariffs had to be invented, the successor of which is 
the current Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (‘Harmonized System’ or HS) 
classification.
14
 This taxonomy provides a uniform classification of goods with numerical codes. A 
two-digit number refers to a family of goods (e.g., textiles), whereas a six-digit number, the maximum 
number of digits permitted in the HS system, identifies a particular species of that good (e.g., shirts 
with polyester). The HS system classifies products according to their characteristics and 
properties. The end-use or the manufacturing methods used in production are not relevant, unless that 
end-use or manufacturing method had an impact on the product’s properties. In other words, HS tariff 
classifications do not reflect social preferences (e.g., produced consistent with environmentally-
sustainable or labor-friendly standards), but rather product characteristics (e.g., cotton- or polyester).  
It did not have to be this way. Tariff classifications can reflect social preferences. In fact, today, 
some national tariff classifications do. Article 3.3 of the International Convention on the Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System (“HS Convention) allows for national subclassifications. 
The EU, and the US and others negotiate at the eight-, ten- and higher digit level classifications. These 
remain, however, national idiosyncratic classifications. The first attempt to design a multilateral tariff 
classification that includes social preferences – the WTO Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) – is 
under way at the moment of writing. That classification will provide the basis for negotiating further 
tariff reductions for products in areas such as clean energy, energy efficiency, air pollution control, 
and environmental monitoring and analysis. 
1.2 Disciplines on NTMs: Insurance against Concession Erosion 
Without negotiation of HS classifications that reflect social preferences, a GATT member that wishes 
to restrict import of goods or services inconsistent with its environmental, labor, and food safety 
preferences has two options. The government may block the imports at the border and, if challenged 
by another member, try to justify its action through recourse to general exceptions to the GATT 
(Article XX). Or, the regulating government could impose a regulatory measure, such as a sales ban, 
and, if challenged, explain why that regulatory action is nondiscriminatory. The first option has no 
advantages at all under the GATT. The burden of proof stays with the regulating state, and it still has 
to meet the nondiscrimination-test embedded in the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT. In the second 
case, the complainants carry the associated burden of production of proof, and persuasion.
15
 
Unsurprisingly, GATT members prefer to impose regulatory measures that ban sales instead of 
imposing bans on imports.  
                                                     
13
 The negotiating record discussed in Irwin et al. (2008) is clear on this score. The WTO Appellate Body (AB) accepted as 
much in its report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II. 
14
 The International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (“HS Convention”) 
governs the HS. The World Customs Organization maintains the HS, which now more than 200 countries use and covers 
5,000 commodity groups and more than 98 percent of the world’s trade in goods. See World Customs Organization, 
What is the Harmonized System (HS)? at http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/overview/what-is-the-
harmonized-system.aspx. 
15
 Viewed from this angle, it is quite remarkable that the US defended its measures on US-Shrimp under Article XX, when 
it could have done so under Article III of GATT, by adopting a sales ban on shrimps that had been fished in a manner that 
prejudiced the life of sea turtles. 
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The burden then falls to the GATT (and later the WTO) judge to determine whether the measure is 
nondiscriminatory. The purpose of our paper is not to debate the quality of case law in this context, 
beyond noting that the exercise has been fraught.
16
 Defining “protection”, especially in the regulatory 
context, is difficult and dependent on the activity and regulatory context. Trade effects could be the 
necessary and unintended by-product of pursuing an environmental or other legitimate social 
objective. A regulation, for example, that bans the sale of cars without catalyst might be motivated by 
environmental concerns to reduce emissions. It will also exclude from the market all cars that do not 
carry a catalyst. Protectionist intent is difficult to reveal, since as in prisoner’s dilemma, the regulator, 
the possessor of the private information, has little or no incentive to reveal the true intent of its 
actions.
17
 Without a demonstrated intent to protect (and/or protectionist effect), many regulatory 
measures can be interpreted in multiple ways.  
1.3 The Consequence 
The GATT-think that characterizes its framers’ ingenious approach to tariffs and border restrictions 
does not apply in any direct way to regulations and other non-tariff measures. The GATT framers 
devoted several provisions to the treatment of tariffs (Articles II, XXVIII, XXVIII bis, and indirectly 
VI, VII, VIII of GATT), but only one provision on the treatment of non-tariff measures, namely, the 
nondiscrimination requirements in Article III. The agreement is largely unconcerned whether domestic 
policies and their underlying social preferences are pursued unilaterally. It also does not address the 
negative externalities for trade and effective regulation that may result from that uncoordinated action. 
The nondiscrimination requirement on domestic policies in the GATT exhibits a binary function. 
Unless the regulatory standards of the importing state have been met, exporters will not access foreign 
markets even when duties are at zero level. Even excessive legislation passes muster provided that it is 
nondiscriminatory. The GATT does not attempt to rationalize domestic policies or facilitate their 
efficiency and effectiveness. As long as the same burden is imposed on domestic and foreign goods, 
measures satisfy the nondiscrimination requirement.
18
  
Could the GATT framers have done better? Perhaps not. Baldwin (1971) has persuasively argued 
that tariffs were high and regulation mostly nondiscriminatory
19
 in 1947 and, thus, it is understandable 
that domestic policies were not the focus of GATT framers. Participating governments had little 
interest in limiting their freedom in areas like product safety for sake of ‘a mere trade agreement.’ 
(Hudec, 1990). Social preferences and regulations did not fit easily with the notion of reciprocal 
negotiations central to the GATT. Workers rights, competition policy, and other issues of economic 
and social regulation were to be taken up later in the International Trade Organization (ITO), of which 
the GATT was meant to be a part (Slaughter, 1992). As Horn et al. (2011) shows, when returns 
become diminishing, trade negotiators are apt to call it a day and leave it to subsequent negotiation(s) 
and/or adjudicators to ‘complete’ the contract.  
Even with this limited mandate, the GATT produced important benefits. These include binding the 
negotiated tariff reductions for an extended period, establishing the principle of nondiscrimination in 
international trade, improving the transparency and predictability of many trade policy measures, and 
providing a forum for future negotiations and for the peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes (Bown & 
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 See Mavroidis (2016) vol. 2, pp. 447-453. 
17
 Bagwell and Staiger (2002). 
18
 Grossman et al. (2013) explain this point in detail. Case law has disturbed the balance struck by the GATT framers. At 
the end of the day though, the absence of clear methodology and the commission of some judicial errors notwithstanding, 
more often than not the spirit of what we have described so far has been somewhat respected.  
19
 This was the case for various reasons. Tariffs represented the preferred instrument of protection, since it is simple and 
efficient means to do so. Domestic regulation often addressed distortions irrespective of their origin. Furthermore, 
because tariffs could be used anyway, why should regulation of domestic policies be discriminatory?  
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Irwin, 2016). GATT is widely viewed as having facilitated the reduction of tariffs—at least in higher-
income nations, which included most of the original 23 GATT member countries.  
2. The WTO and Managing the GATT’s Success 
When the original member states signed the GATT in 1947, the objectives were a rules-based global 
trading system and fewer border restraints on trade. By the 1970s, both goals were well on their way to 
being achieved. Tariffs had declined dramatically, at least on the industrial goods on which higher-
income countries were willing to negotiate. These gains were spurred by reciprocal concessions, 
extended by the non-discrimination requirement, and enforced by dispute settlement under the GATT. 
With lower tariffs, the role of regulations and standards as potential barriers to trade became more 
apparent (Baldwin, 1971).  
At the same time, new regulatory institutions arose and social preferences evolved, expanded, and 
were embedded in government policies in the decades following the post-war era (Levi-Faur, 2005). 
With economic growth, came an expansion of the middle class in many higher-income nations and a 
greater interest in quality of life concerns (Inglehart, 2000). The new regulatory institutions and rules 
that emerged during this time covered the safety of the workplace, the reliability of consumer 
products, the relations between employers and employees, the fairness of the market, the quality of air, 
water, and other environmental concerns, and various aspects of national life. 
The multilateral trade agenda shifted tentatively in the direction of addressing nontariff measures in 
the Tokyo Round of the GATT (1973-1979) and the negotiation of “codes.”20 The Tokyo Round codes 
were plurilateral agreements negotiated and voluntarily adopted by only some GATT members. The 
Tokyo Round produced codes with new disciplines on non-tariff issues including subsidies, 
government procurement, bovine meat, dairy, and technical barriers to the trade in goods (i.e., 
labeling, packaging, production, and products regulations and standards).  
With the start of the Uruguay Round in 1986, higher income countries, which had already achieved 
significant tariff reductions in their sectors of greatest interest, pushed for disciplines on the emerging 
priorities of their exporters, such as intellectual property rights and trade in services. Higher-income 
countries also wanted to update the Tokyo Round codes to address other areas of regulation and to 
ensure that all members adopted the codes as part of a single undertaking. In exchange, sectors that 
were still marked by high tariffs and not included in previous GATT rounds—agriculture, clothing and 
labor-intensive industrial goods — were put on the table to spur the interest of less wealthy countries 
and their lower-wage exporters. This deal was intended to generate momentum for future multilateral 
trade liberalization by broadening its focus, both in terms of increasing the number of member 
countries and the areas to be negotiated. 
In that sense, the WTO, which launched on January 1, 1995 after the Uruguay Round, can be seen 
as an effort to manage the success of the GATT. The results were mixed. More than 70 low- and 
middle-income countries joined the GATT/WTO since the start of the Uruguay Round. The goods 
sectors that remained stubbornly outside of the GATT were tamed with the signing of the Agreement 
on Agriculture, and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. With tariffs on their way out of most 
other sectors, the focus of the WTO shifted to non-tariff measures and barriers, but its approach 
remained largely one of negative integration. Multilateral trade liberalization at the WTO has largely 
ground to a halt after the Uruguay Round; the current the Doha Round has stalled since 2001. 
The question that the framers of the WTO needed to ask was whether the approach to disciplining 
non-tariff measures should change from GATT-think with the decline of tariffs and the expansion of 
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 A more limited use of plurilateral codes already existed in the GATT. The Kennedy Round of negotiations in the 1960s 
produced a plurilateral code on antidumping.  
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the GATT/WTO membership. Was the priority for disciplines on non-tariff measures still ensuring 
against erosion of tariff concessions once global tariffs levels were relatively low and countries began 
unilaterally reducing tariff levels well beyond their bound levels? Or, should there be more positive 
integration of countries’ regulatory objectives and social preferences into multilateral trade 
cooperation? WTO framers responded with the German word “jein”, something between “ja”, and 
“nein”, as we explain in what follows.  
2.1 Elaborate Tariff Classifications 
There was no formal move toward greater accommodation of social preferences into the HS system, 
but countries have been moving in that direction. In the beginning, only the EU and United States had 
elaborate tariff classifications. Over the years, other WTO members have begun to do the same. 
Expanded tariff classifications allow countries to target narrower classes of goods for preferential 
treatment, including those that reflect important social values. On the other hand, with more elaborate 
tariff classifications, WTO members may advance demanding regulatory standards, which may reduce 
their possible sources of origin of those goods to a handful of more developed nations. The obligation 
to extend concessions on these regulation-informed tariff lines to other WTO member states on a 
nondiscriminatory (most-favored nation) basis may not mean much without a corresponding effort to 
improve their technical capacity to meet its requirements.  
National tariff classifications do not benefit from an irrefutable presumption of legality. They are 
WTO-compliant only if the classification meets the standard embedded in Article 3.3 of HS, which is 
that they are sub-classifications of HS classifications at the six-digit level. Case law suggests that it 
may be permissible to include, inter alia, end uses and consumer preferences in those sub-
classifications.
21
 Surprisingly, there have been no disputes on this score yet, even though consumers 
and governments may have different preferences (otherwise there is no need to preempt consumers’ 
choice through elaborate classifications). One reason for the lack of litigation may be the limited 
advantage afforded by using these classifications to reduce already low tariff levels. 
2.2 Non-Tariff Measures 
The WTO added two agreements (one new, one renewed) to its arsenal on regulations and other non-
tariff measures. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) is an update of the Tokyo round 
agreement on the same subject, whereas the Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (SPS) 
measures is a novelty that covers measures protecting human and animal health, and the environment 
from pests and diseases. The GATT also remained in place and covers transactions that do not fall 
under the SPS and the TBT Agreements.  
The TBT and SPS Agreements mostly function as an insurance policy to preserve the value of tariff 
concessions. This is particularly true for the SPS Agreement, which was included to guard against 
reintroducing the EU common agricultural policy (CAP) through regulation. Various WTO members 
fought long and hard to persuade the EU to reform its CAP. The last thing those members wished to 
see was the emergence of non-tariff measures in lieu of the CAP’s variable duties.22  
Parts of the TBT and SPS Agreements, however, do more than protect against erosion of tariff 
concessions. Both Agreements include provisions that promote consideration of the negative impact 
that unilateral or excessive exercise of regulatory authority might entail, but do not go so far as to 
oblige WTO members to adopt a particular standard of protection or most efficient measure to achieve 
the stated social preference.  
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The TBT Agreement recommends performance- over process-based measures, because there may 
be gains from having different approaches to meet regulatory objectives (art. 2.8). It requires 
governments to base their interventions on international standards, if the latter exist and are 
appropriate to the social preferences pursued (art. 2.4). The TBT Agreement mandates that regulatory 
measures to be necessary to achieve their objective and to be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner 
(art. 2.1, 2.2). “Necessary” means that WTO members must, when faced with regulatory alternatives 
that are equally efficient to achieve the stated social preferences, choose the measure that has less 
impact on the global volume of goods traded.
23
 In the TBT- and SPS- context, it also means that a 
WTO member should contemplate the necessity to intervene with its own regulatory measure in the 
first place.
24
 This obligation is meant to reduce measures that unnecessarily duplicate the regulations 
of the exporting market or unnecessarily diverge from the international standard. For this reason, 
international standards are presumed necessary under the TBT Agreement (art. 2.5). Finally, the TBT 
includes a mix of legally binding obligations (like obligations to notify and explain national 
regulations) and a best efforts requirement to pursue mutual recognition, equivalency, and 
harmonization initiatives with other WTO members (art. 2.5-2.7).  
The SPS Agreement goes even further. Besides fulfilling all the same requirements that are in the 
TBT Agreement, WTO members must also adopt science-based measures and be consistent in 
formulating their policies (art. 2.2). Science is of course, the universal language, and often the best 
indicator that a measure has not been enacted with protectionist intent. The consistency-requirement 
reinforces this requirement, since it requires WTO members to treat risks in a comparable manner (art. 
2.3). 
The provisions on necessity, science, consistency, and international standards in the TBT and SPS 
Agreements have served as additional proxies (besides the nondiscriminatory application of measures) 
for suppressing protectionist behavior, but seek to do more. These rules are also meant to discourage 
measures that have no disparate impact on imports, but are still excessive in achieving their intended 
regulatory objective.
25
 There is little evidence, however, that these provisions have convinced 
countries not to adopt unilaterally regulatory measures that are duplicative, unnecessarily divergent, or 
inefficient. The WTO is still largely in a negative integration mode on regulatory measures and social 
preferences. Liberalization of investment is of course, a mitigating factor, since foreign investors will 
lobby host governments and press for adoption of measures consistent with their regulatory interests. 
But it is only a mitigating factor. The WTO has only now started to take the first steps towards 
regulatory cooperation. 
2.3 Regulatory Cooperation in WTO 
What is regulatory cooperation and why is it necessary? The term itself is like an accordion. It has 
been used to mean as little as dialogue and an agreement to notify and consult on a new or proposed 
regulatory measure or as much as to refer to an obligation to adopt international standards or to 
recognize or harmonize with another nation’s laws.26  
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Trade officials are interested in regulatory cooperation because there are few feasible alternatives 
for reducing the restraints that nondiscriminatory regulations may impose on international commerce. 
Unlike tariffs, one cannot (and should not) eliminate regulation. Regulations are essential tools with 
which to promote public health and safety, safeguard the environment and rights of citizens, and 
ensure the proper functioning of markets. Excessive, duplicative, or unnecessarily divergent 
regulations and conformity assessment procedures, however, can thwart the interoperability and 
effectiveness of regulatory systems, raise costs for businesses and citizens, and disadvantage foreign 
suppliers, which lack the inside knowledge of their counterparts (Sykes, 1999). Nondiscrimination, a 
key tenant of GATT-think, is limited in addressing this problem.  
Prohibiting non-tariff barriers to trade (“negative integration”) has helped open markets, but has not 
yielded consistent, efficient, and effective oversight. OECD (2013) has identified three categories of 
costs from international regulatory incoherence: (1) informational costs of identifying and 
understanding different regulations; (2) specification costs of complying with divergent and 
duplicative regulatory standards in export markets; and (3) conformity assessment costs of 
demonstrating compliance with standards. Absent cooperation or the ability to pay these adjustment 
costs, foreign producers and suppliers, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, face market 
exclusion (Maskus, 2005).  
There are three basic scenarios where international regulatory incoherence, even when not directed 
against foreign producers, may occur and not be effectively restrained by the provisions in the SPS 
and TBT Agreements. First, regulatory authorities may impose duplicative rules and conformity 
assessment procedures. This scenario may result from lack of awareness or concern with the trade 
costs of these redundancies. National regulatory authorities are primarily accountable for fulfilling 
their mandate to domestic constituencies, not to foreign producers. Duplicative regulation may also 
arise when a national regulator lacks confidence in its foreign counterpart to monitor and enforce the 
rules competently. It may also be the product of rent-seeking, used to generate fees to support 
regulatory agencies and the staff salaries devoted to overseeing and enforcing the rule.  
Second, regulatory authorities may impose divergent, but similarly stringent rules. This scenario is 
most likely to occur among states at similar levels of economic development. Even among otherwise 
like-minded democratic, advanced industrialized economies, regulatory differences are inevitable. 
Regulation starts out as the answer to a domestic problem, developed within a preexisting national 
regulatory framework. So while the social preferences and attitudes toward risk may be similar in two 
countries, governments may still devise different rules and enforce them differently because they are 
better suited to their particular institutional structures and rulemaking procedures (Drezner, 2008).  
Third, regulatory authorities may impose divergent rules and conformity assessment procedures 
with different levels of stringency. This scenario is most likely to occur with states at different levels 
of economic development. At low-levels of income, citizens and their governments tend to prioritize 
economic growth and efficiency over stringent domestic regulatory oversight.
27
 As personal incomes 
increase, many lower-income nations are working to raise regulatory standards and improve oversight, 
especially over goods and services destined for export, but face capacity, resource, and governance 
challenges in doing so.
28
 
The regulatory incoherence in each of these scenarios does not run afoul of WTO restrictions on 
discriminatory measures or the provisions in the TBT and SPS Agreements on using necessary, 
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science-based, and consistent regulatory measures and international standards where appropriate. In 
other words, the reasons for the incoherence are not protectionist or even domestically irrational, but 
the outcome remains inefficient for trade and, often, for achieving effective international regulatory 
oversight. The TBT and SPS Agreements include mutual recognition and equivalence provisions to 
help address the problem, but they are limited to best endeavors.
29
 
It is in these scenarios where international regulatory cooperation is necessary. Dialogues and 
cooperation agreements, for instance, can help improve transparency, sensitize trading nations to 
others’ needs and costs, and advance coordination among regulators and between regulators, 
businesses, and trade officials.
30
 Peer-to-peer regulatory networks, consensus best practice guidelines 
and principles, and intergovernmental organizations promote work sharing and build regulatory and 
enforcement capacity, making it cheaper for nations to adopt policy reforms and maintain consistent 
regulatory oversight.
31
 At the same time, mutual recognition agreements and regional trade deals can 
help increase the benefits of adopting convergent, adequate, and efficient regulations and conformity 
assessment by reinforcing their link to market access.
32
  
2.3.1 Cooperation in WTO on non-tariff measures 
The WTO has taken some tentative steps towards establishing regulatory cooperation with the advent 
of the TBT- and the SPS Agreements.
33
 Both agreements include measures to promote regulatory 
transparency and adoption of international standards. These measures facilitate trade and regulatory 
objectives by providing predictability for exporters and investors and simplifying regulatory 
compliance.
34
  
Both agreements also provide a procedure for raising specific trade concerns (STCs), a more 
intensive avenue for engagement on nontariff measures that stops short of formal dispute settlement. 
STCs are formal requests for clarification by a WTO member regarding another member states’ TBT- 
or SPS-related measure, whether that measure was notified or if the other member state learned of 
measure without notification. STCs could lead to informal settlement or provide the basis for a formal 
dispute.
35
 STCs represent a form of cooperation at the very beginning of the spectrum that could lead 
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to common rules. Since advent of the WTO, there has been an upward trend in the STCs filed 
annually, from 4 in 1995 to 85 in 2014 (Wijkström, 2015). 
WTO members further discuss issues regarding the administration of regulatory measures in the 
committees created under the aegis of the SPS and TBT Agreements. Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement 
includes the Code of Good Practice (CGP) for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of 
Standards, which encourages standard setting bodies to be transparent and promulgate 
nondiscriminatory, performance-based, and non-duplicative standards. In 2000, the WTO Committee 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee) agreed to additional principles for the work of 
international standard setting bodies, which include transparency, openness, and an impartial and 
consensus-driven approach that promotes effective and relevant standards and incorporates the 
concerns of developing countries (WTO, 2000). The TBT Committee has also promoted the use of 
good regulatory practices in workshops and in its fifth triennial review.
36
 Good regulatory practices 
promote the exchange of information and more coordination among regulators, standard setting 
bodies, and trade officials. In 2014, the SPS Committee launched a mechanism to mediate rising trade 
tensions over food safety and animal-plant health measures.
37
 
At this stage, it is difficult to evaluate the impact of WTO efforts on regulatory cooperation, but 
one should probably not expect too much. Without a greater mandate and more institutional support, 
these WTO efforts seem more likely to serve as guideline for unilateral actions by members, rather 
than the first step towards establishing a forum for cooperation between members.  
2.3.2 Tariffs 
Regulatory cooperation at the WTO is taking place in the realm of tariff classifications as well. 
Although not formally under the auspices of the WTO, for the time being at least, negotiation of the 
EGA were launched in July 2014.
38
 The purpose of the negotiation is to agree on preferential tariffs 
for goods that protect environment. To do this, negotiators have to agree on classifications that reflect 
regulatory processes that promote environmental protective goods and provide tariff advantages to 
those goods that conform to the agreed process. 
3. The Changing Political Economy of Trade, Regulatory Cooperation, and Social 
Preferences  
The way the world trades is changing. Not only are trade barriers now predominantly nontariff 
measures, there are also fewer goods and services that originate from any one country or any one 
supplier. More trade occurs via global value chains (GVCs), in which different firms in different 
countries undertake different parts of the process of producing a good or service. GVCs started in the 
1960s when international companies took advantage of lower tariffs, the containerization of shipping, 
and better information and communication technologies to slice up and outsource parts of their 
manufacturing supply chains to lower-cost, specialist suppliers abroad. In the 1990s and 2000s, the 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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shift to GVCs expanded to services and to sectors ranging from food production to medical R&D. 
With the 2008 global economic crisis, GVCs evolved again, becoming more regional and reorienting 
around large emerging economies with rising production capabilities and more domestic consumer 
demand (Gereffi, 2014). The inputs and components in GVCs comprise 56 percent of the global goods 
trade and 73 percent of the services trade (WTO, 2011). 
The rise of GVCs has had significant benefits.
39
 Unbundling affords businesses the opportunity to 
scale economies, implement just-in-time production, and greater flexibility in meeting consumer 
demand. Consumers gain more affordable goods and services. GVCs have contributed to the shift of 
employment in labor-intensive sectors away from higher-income nations – a painful and unsettling 
process for the workers and communities affected – but it has also created specialized, higher-wage 
jobs in those nations coordinating production networks and in product design, branding, and other 
large-margin activities. The unbundling of production has also reduced the barriers to lower-income 
countries competing in the world economy, which enable those nations to industrialize through GVCs 
and to lift tens of millions of their citizens out of abject poverty.  
Sustaining and expanding these benefits of GVCs requires consistent, adequate and efficient 
regulation. GVCs involve the cross border movement of capital, knowledge, and intermediate services 
and parts. As the number of countries and cross-border transactions in GVCs multiply, so do the 
economic costs of inefficient, duplicative, and divergent regulations. The proliferation of 
uncoordinated regulations challenges even sophisticated multinationals. The high costs of regulatory 
compliance can keep small and medium-sized businesses out of GVCs altogether. Divergent rules on 
data storage and analysis and product testing can act as localization requirements, making production 
in other jurisdictions infeasible (OECD, 2015). According to the WTO World Trade Report (2009), 
one-third of the global trade in goods (estimated $15.8 trillion in 2008) was affected by standards that 
differ across jurisdictions. 
Consistent, adequate, and efficient regulatory oversight is also important to the viability of GVCs 
as a means of economic development. Goods and services must ultimately satisfy the social 
preferences of consumers and the standards of national regulatory authorities and retailers in end-user 
markets. Inability to comply reliably with food safety rules, labor standards, or environmental 
requirements can lead to border detentions and import bans, liability and reputational damage, and 
contractual penalties for manufacturers and suppliers. It can deter foreign direct investment in 
countries. Particularly in export driven lower-income economies, the costs of regulatory non-
compliance can be significant. In the context of GVCs, adequate, consistent regulatory oversight no 
longer just ensures social preferences; it is an investment in economic development and trade 
facilitation (National Academy of Sciences, 2012).
40
 
Health, labor, financial and environmental policymakers likewise have an interest in adequate, 
consistent, and collaborative international regulation. In the GVC context, regulatory agencies cannot 
do their jobs without the help of their counterparts. Imports that the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration regulates, for example, have grown nearly six fold (from six million to 35 million 
shipments) over the twelve years and now involve more than 300,000 facilities in more than150 
different countries.
41
 There are legal and practical limits on inspecting such a multitude of producers 
and suppliers. Border and port surveillance can supplement but not replace oversight, control, and 
surveillance by local regulators and industry. In sectors involving global public goods – such as 
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stemming climate change, financial contagion, or pollution – regulatory objectives cannot be met 
without international coordination. International collaboration helps regulators gather information, 
develop, and share best regulatory practices and tools, and to build the knowledge base for effective 
regulation (De Búrca, Keohane & Sabel, 2014; Sabel, 2015). For all these reasons, and in many 
sectors, regulatory oversight in one country increasingly depends on the adequacy and consistency of 
regulatory oversight in other countries (Bollyky, 2009, 2012, 2015). 
3.1 The Case for a Positive Integration Strategy on Trade & Regulation 
If internationally consistent, efficient, and adequate regulatory oversight provides compound benefits, 
it may seem unnecessary for governments to engage international regulatory cooperation to achieve it. 
Why don’t governments undertake the necessary regulatory reforms unilaterally? Here, there is a 
partial analogy to GATT-think and enlightened mercantilism helps demonstrate the need for 
international regulatory cooperation and the reasons why negotiators and regulators need to pursue 
that objective together. 
There are regulatory reforms that government may undertake unilaterally that have benefits for 
trade. Countries may increase their export competitiveness by unilaterally adopting good regulatory 
practices.
42
 Improving the quality, transparency, and predictability of regulatory measures helps 
domestic actors and importers alike (Jacobs and Ladegaard, 2010). Over time, adoption of 
administrative law practices like regulatory impact assessment might also assist exporters if it brings 
the trade and regulatory communities closer and sensitizes both sides to each other’s concerns 
(Coglianese, 2016).  
Yet, as in GATT-think, structured international regulatory cooperation provides benefits that may 
not be easily achieved unilaterally: predictability, greater accountability for backsliding, iterative 
engagement on deepening integration, and gains in efficiencies from increased scale (Irwin, 2015). 
Regulations are also not like tariffs, which can be effectively liberalized unilaterally. Regulations are 
dynamic, with rules and their enforcement changing in response to emerging political and market 
demands. Unilateral adoption of good regulatory practices can only do so much to spur freer trade if 
other nations also do not reciprocate and maintain the internationally consistent, adequate measures 
and shared conformity assessments that both exporters and regulators need in this GVC-dominated 
economy (Bollyky, 2012).  
Further, international, rules-based cooperation has an important role in improving domestic-
decision making. Even in democratic governments, domestic interests may undermine or subvert good 
regulatory practices such as the obligation to provide notice and comment and assess the cost-benefits 
of proposed rules. The accountability and transparency that comes with iterative international 
regulatory engagement on shared goals provides an important restraint on that occurring. 
As in GATT-think, international agreements to advance regulatory cooperation also may create the 
political support and domestic constituencies for making the necessary policy reforms. In this context, 
trade and regulators need each other.  
Trade negotiators are unlikely to advance their priorities on improved international regulatory 
coherence without the support and active participation of regulatory officials. The reasons are twofold. 
First, consistent, efficient regulatory oversight depends as much on how rules are interpreted and 
enforced as the rules themselves. Even with the support of a country’s leadership, it is difficult in a 
top-down approach to mandate and maintain iterative, cooperative behavior. Meaningful, sustained 
progress is more likely if the objective is addressing transnational regulatory priorities as well as 
facilitating international commerce. 
                                                     
42
 OECD (2005); World Bank (2012); OECD (2002). 
Thomas J. Bollyky and Petros C. Mavroidis 
14 
Second, without the engagement of regulatory authorities, concerns about diminishing cherished 
social preferences would make the already difficult politics of trade liberalization unworkable. Fears 
over food safety and genetically modified organisms have driven a fierce backlash in the EU against 
the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Popular support for greater 
global economic integration is more likely to occur in a regulator-supported effort to ensure that freer 
trade also results in safer goods, a more protected environment, and more assured public health and 
welfare. 
Conversely, regulatory cooperation initiatives have better prospects if pursued in partnership with 
trade officials and aligned with the needs of exporters and their governments. Here too, the reasons are 
twofold. First, regulatory agencies are chronically underfunded and domestic in their orientation. Few 
of these agencies have the resources, staff, and mandate to pursue international cooperation and 
capacity building. Trade talks provide the structure, resources, and high-level political commitment 
that international regulatory dialogues often lack.  
Second, advancing international cooperation in regulatory dialogues alone is unlikely to exploit the 
opportunity that the rise of GVCs presents. The challenge of achieving international cooperation is 
greatest in areas where (1) regulatory regimes are mature and (2) the responsible agencies in large 
consumer-markets disagree (Drezner, 2008). Even non-substantive changes, such as adoption of 
common forms or sharing of inspection reports, impose adjustment costs on regulatory agencies with 
well-established systems in that area. The adoption of international standards in many heavily 
regulated sectors has been slow and in high-income countries, such as the United States, poor.
43
 
Regulator-to-regulator dialogues such as the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use can make progress, but have 
required decades to do so.
44
  
The rise of GVCs provides a powerful, but time-limited incentive for regulatory agencies to incur 
adjustment costs in order to spread their norms and standards to the many other countries involved in 
producing goods and services for import in their markets. The incentive exists because adoption of 
common rules and certification regimes helps spread those rules internationally, by making it easier 
for exporters and investors in third-party countries to achieve economies of scale by complying with 
regulations in multiple large consumer markets (Vogel, 1995; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Greenhill 
et al., 2009). 
That incentive is time-limited because it may become harder to drive adoption of international 
norms as consumer spending in emerging economies grows and these markets become a bigger target 
for exporters. Further growth and a shift to more domestic consumption in emerging economies are 
positive trends, but adding more large-consumer markets will make reaching agreement on regulatory 
standards harder, especially in the absence of an effective multilateral institutional support. The 
emerging trends of large multinational companies localizing production in big end-use markets
45
 and 
the increasing reliance of these companies on private standards, third-party certifications and 
proprietary quality management systems only compound that challenge. 
3.2 Bilateral and regional trade initiatives on regulatory cooperation 
There is no better argument that the WTO does not do enough in the realm of regulatory cooperation 
and social preferences than the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that seek to 
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address these topics. In 1990, there were approximately seventy active PTAs; today there are more 
than 500.
46
 The explosive growth in the number of PTAs began with the end of the Uruguay round and 
the increased relative importance of non-tariff measures as potential restraints on trade.
 47
 Roughly 60 
of these PTAs have terms that go beyond the WTO TBT commitments; fifty have SPS commitments 
that exceed those in WTO agreements. (WTO, 2011). Countries with more extensive participation in 
GVCs are more likely to enter into these ‘deep integration’ PTAs and more likely to reap the benefits 
of doing so (Orefice & Roca, 2014). 
The four major PTAs under negotiation at the time of writing – the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Trade in Services Agreement 
(TISA) and the TTIP – all include efforts to advance regulatory cooperation beyond disciplines on 
nondiscrimination. Serious regulatory cooperation also occurs in the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) and other standard-setting institutions that include trade facilitation and 
promoting common standards in their mandate.  
To date, the most ambitious regulatory cooperation efforts have occurred in PTAs among like-
minded nations with regional ties. The EU has pursued regulatory integration among its 28 member 
states through a wide variety of means including mutual recognition, harmonization, and cooperative 
approaches such as joint reviews. The United States has launched regulatory cooperation councils with 
Canada and Mexico (Steger, 2012). Most of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA), the pending deal between Canada and the EU, is devoted to product regulation, mutual 
recognition, and procedures for regulatory cooperation rather than reducing tariffs and other border 
restraints.
48
  
While the like-mindedness of participating states often helps advance regulatory cooperation, it is 
possible to achieve among heterogeneous trading partners as well. Developing countries have agreed 
to environmental commitments in PTAs, when those states have not exhibited similar eagerness to do 
so at the multilateral level.
49
 One reason for doing so might be the additional trade gains afforded in a 
PTA. The intensity of cooperation might differ, however, among heterogeneous trade partners. Like-
minded trading partners have proven more willing to agree to binding disciplines, whereas this has not 
necessarily been the case between unlike-minded players.
50
 Still, nonbinding commitments may be 
useful to sensitize trading partners to the worries of their counterparts, to encourage information 
exchange on the rationale for the regulatory intervention, and to set the stage for more rigorous 
cooperation in the future. 
The prospects for regulatory cooperation are not limitless even when pursued with like-minded 
partners. Policy independence and regulatory sovereignty were among the reasons (along with anti-
immigration) cited in the United Kingdom’s June 2016 vote to exit the EU.51 The 2007 initiative by 
Australia and New Zealand to create the Therapeutic Products Authority, a joint regulatory agency for 
medicines and medical devices, failed.
52
 Previous initiatives to improve EU-U.S. regulatory 
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cooperation have made little progress.
53
 The near-term prospects for a successful conclusion of the 
TTIP talks do not look good at the time of writing.  
Where regulatory cooperation has occurred, however, it has brought real benefits to like-minded 
trade and regulatory partners. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries have used 
to mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) and cooperation on standards, technical regulations, and 
conformity assessment to promote themselves as a GVC hub (WTO, 2011). Transatlantic cooperation 
initiatives may have led to few regulatory changes, but they have helped reduce trade friction.
54
  
3.3 PTAs are a second best solution  
Deep integration PTAs are not entirely outside the ambit of the WTO, since free trade areas and 
customs unions operate within the four corners of the multilateral trading system. But, it is still 
important to ‘multilateralize’ the progress on international regulatory cooperation occurring in PTAs 
and regional economic communities and bring into the WTO. Here is why.  
PTAs are a second-best solution to the problem of achieving freer trade and better regulation 
because these agreements do not encompass the range of countries in global commerce.
55
 The 
organization of production and trade into international value chains and networks means that end 
products are affected by many regulatory jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions are diverse, including 
nations at different stages of economic development and some with relatively nascent regulatory 
agencies.
56
 Agreements with rules that do not span all these economies cannot effectively advance 
global integration and efficiency, particularly in sectors dominated by GVCs and dependent on cross-
border data flows and digital commerce.
57
  
Pursuing international regulatory cooperation on a multilateral basis and within WTO offers 
important advantages. It avoids the need to introducing multiple parallel discussions on regulatory and 
trading partner counterparts. It also takes advantage of the process for regulatory convergence, albeit 
rudimentary, that is already in place at the WTO. 
Many developing countries, especially the lowest-income nations, are generally not included in 
RCEP, TPP, or the other PTAs with ambitious commitments on regulatory cooperation and 
coordination. The EU has agreements that include regulatory cooperation with African countries, but 
they are generally not binding (Horn, Mavroidis, Sapir, 2010). The PTAs that involve low- and 
middle-income countries do not include particularly ‘deep’ or enforceable regulatory commitments or 
go beyond those in WTO agreements (WTO, 2011; Horn, Mavroidis, Sapir, 2010). There has been 
some targeted engagement between the trade and regulatory agencies of varying levels of economic 
development, especially on food safety and in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum, 
but progress has been slow.
58
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The relative lack of engagement of lower-income nations in PTAs and other meaningful 
international regulatory cooperation initiatives is important because the avenues for unilateral 
liberalization are limited in the regulatory context. After the advent of the WTO, the lack of progress 
on the Doha Development Agenda, the next round of WTO negotiations, did not prevent emerging 
economies from unilaterally reducing tariffs and barriers to investment in order to better compete in a 
world economy dominated by GVCs.
59
 In the regulatory context, as discussed above, unilateral 
approaches are more limited.  
4. The New WTO Think 
In a global economy increasingly dominated by GVCs, picking between freer trade and better 
regulation is increasingly a false choice. Pursuing regulatory cooperation as a strategy for trade 
liberalization (and vice versa) offers a more promising way for policymakers and negotiators to 
advance both economic objectives and social preferences on worker safety, a cleaner environment, and 
healthier, more sustainable products. It is the present alternative –trade officials and regulators 
operating unilaterally and in parallel – that leaves the fulfillment of those social preferences more at 
risk and international commercial goals unmet.  
In this environment, the original precepts of GATT-think – reducing the negative externalities that 
result from uncoordinated and non-transparent actions in a trading system with many partners – 
remains as relevant as ever. But, the corporate governance of the GATT/WTO must change to reflect 
the decline in tariffs and the other traditional barriers to commerce and the emerging challenges of 
advancing trade, regulation cooperation, and social preferences in a global economy dominated by 
GVCs. We refer to this integration strategy as the “new WTO think”. In what follows, we explore the 
parameters of that concept, and provide our ‘nudge’ for a serious discussion on WTO institutional 
reform. 
4.1 The Need for Changes in the Corporate Governance of WTO 
The rules and procedures of the WTO were designed for a different global economy in which mostly 
finished goods moved across national borders. With the rise of GVCs, tariffs and other border 
restraints matter less and the protection of investments and intellectual property, and free flow of 
components, services, and people matters more. As a result, effective trade rules and the institutions 
that support that trade must also evolve.  
A focus on market access, simple and broadly applied rules, and dispute resolution will not 
advance the deeper integration that is increasingly required in the world economy. Nondiscrimination 
and reciprocity cannot assure market access when it is conditioned upon satisfying country-specific 
regulatory standards and social preferences (Antras and Staiger, 2015). The availability of binding 
dispute resolution will do little to attract the active engagement of regulatory authorities in 
international cooperation, when those regulatory authorities have bitterly resented past WTO reviews 
of their choices. 
4.2 A Strategy for the New WTO Think 
While the negative integration approach of GATT/WTO may be less relevant, the role for the 
multilateral trade institution remains critical and unlikely to be supplanted by PTAs. Accordingly, the 
WTO should be strengthened and supported.  
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The challenge is doing so at a time when global economic power is increasingly diffuse and there is 
little appetite for empowering a supranational institution to reduce the market segmenting effects of 
regulatory policies and social preferences (Hoekman, 2016). This will require supplementing the 
traditional approach of the GATT/WTO – fixed, universal rules subject to binding dispute resolution – 
with the opportunities for interested members to pursue shared social preferences, plurilateral 
agreements, outside partnerships, and multilaterize the regulatory cooperation occurring via PTAs and 
regional economic communities.  
4.2.1 Social Preferences Advance Trade and Regulatory Cooperation 
Advancing international trade liberalization has emerged as an important way to pursue social 
preferences. The reverse is also becoming true.
60
 The WTO should embrace and reinforce this positive 
link between trade and social preferences, wherever it exists, to advance multilateral agreements on 
regulatory cooperation.  
An increasing number of PTAs, particularly those involving the United States and EU, advance 
social preferences such as labor and environmental protections, human rights, rule of law, and other 
aspects of public governance.
61
 The trend began with the North American Free Trade Agreement as a 
way to resolve political differences in the United States over trade. In the most recent iteration, the 
TPP, many of the labor and environmental measures are enforceable and subject to dispute resolution. 
Promoting social preferences as part of PTAs spreads the benefits of trade liberalization, discourages 
the worst mistreatment of workers and the environment, and builds public support for trade deals 
(Elliott, 2012).  
Conversely, the desire to advance shared social preferences has also spurred interested states to 
pursue trade initiatives in sectors of concern. The EU, for example, established a Forest Law 
Enforcement Governance and Trade Initiative to engage lower-income nations in promoting trade in 
legal timber, increase the market demand for sustainable forestry, and reduce the supply of illegally 
harvested timber (Shaffer, 2015).  
Social preferences are particularly important to trade initiatives in the regulatory cooperation 
context. Shared preferences provide the basis for establishing a broad framework of shared goals that 
may engage the active support and participation of regulators. These regulators, in turn, have the 
sector-specific understanding and mandate to implement, monitor, and maintain meaningful 
cooperation (De Búrca, Keohane & Sabel, 2014). The alternative of advancing internationally 
consistent, efficient, and effective regulations without embracing a larger role for social preferences 
and norms in WTO agreements seems hopeless.  
Trade disciplines, like most laws and regulations, are generally less effective when they require 
taking iterative, positive action instead of just refraining from unwanted behavior. Compliance with 
the notification or technical transfer requirements in trade agreements, for example, has been poor 
(Maskus, 2012; Josling & Roberts, 2011). Mandating that regulators cooperate or consider the trade 
impact of their proposed rules is likely to be less effective than providing a workable framework for 
interested states to advance shared social preferences and consistent, effective, and efficient oversight 
in commercially important sectors.  
The WTO has taken a tentative step in this direction with the negotiation on an EGA. This 
plurilateral agreement is to be concluded between the EU, United States, China, and fourteen other 
WTO members accounting for nearly 90 percent of the world’s trade in environmental goods. The 
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core of the agreement is the objective to reduce tariffs on list of 54 environmental goods identified by 
the APEC forum.
62
 
In addition to embracing the social preferences of interested members to advance trade and 
regulatory goals, the EGA negotiation sets two other precedents that should be more widely embraced: 
the renewed use of WTO plurilateral agreements and the effort to multilateralize progress that 
occurred first on a bilateral or regional basis. 
4.2.2 Variable Geometry 
The WTO counts 164 members. They represent a very heterogeneous whole, ranging from 
Switzerland, Norway and Liechtenstein to the least developed countries in the sub-Saharan Africa. 
The social preferences of each member are of course, defined endogenously and depend, in part, the 
capacity of each member to finance the necessary regulatory policies to give effect to those 
preferences. Regulations reflect the culture, religion, the particulars of legal system, and the relative 
homogeneity of that society. Whereas some social concerns are almost universal (climate change), 
others are quite local (pollution of a lake shared between two WTO members). Under these 
circumstances, it is highly unlikely that regulatory cooperation will involve all its members. 
The current WTO-think is based on the idea of “single undertaking,” in which all members adopt 
agreements. The WTO, with the exception of the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), has, 
for all practical purposes, moved away from the Tokyo Round model of plurilateral integration. Some 
criticized this Tokyo Round model of integration as increasing transaction costs for WTO members. 
This was a rushed judgment. Yes, different WTO members undertook different obligations in the 
Tokyo Round. But the advantage of that approach was the increased legitimacy. Each trading nation 
agreed to the commitments with which it could live. What we recommend here is, in a nutshell, a 
return to that approach, at least on the issue of regulatory cooperation.  
The WTO should encourage the formation of plurilateral agreements,
63
 a design that, unlike free 
trade areas, keeps the umbilical cord between international regulatory cooperation and the multilateral 
trading regime tight. Intense regulatory cooperation is taking place within free trade areas, especially 
among like-minded partners. In light of this, it appears that trading nations gave up on the Tokyo 
round approach of Codes too soon. Those Codes evolved at a moment when WTO agreements on non-
tariff barriers became pressing issue, and when agreement across all GATT members would have been 
impossible. That same dynamic is even more pronounced today.  
The advantages of WTO plurilateral agreements over PTAs are that the former provide greater 
transparency, input, and an explicit path to accession to non-party WTO members in the future. They 
are also less likely than PTAs to impose negative externalities on third countries (Hoekman and 
Mavroidis, 2013, 2014).  
There are two ways in which a subset of WTO Members may currently undertake additional 
commitments and trade liberalization—critical mass agreements (CMAs) and plurilateral agreements 
(PAs). A CMA is an agreement in which negotiated disciplines apply only to a subset of WTO 
Members, but its benefits are implemented on a most-favored nation (MFN) basis and, thus, must 
apply to all WTO Members. The significant advantage of CMAs is that these agreements do not 
require unanimous approval of the full WTO membership. The disadvantage of CMAs are that they 
allow free-riders and MFN disciplines are an uneasy fit with many forms of cooperation that depend 
on like-minded regulatory agencies with similar capacities (Bollyky, 2015).  
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In contrast, neither the benefits nor the commitments undertaken in PAs extend to non-signatories. 
The major other advantage of PAs is, unlike CMAs, clear legal authority exists to extend and deepen 
WTO commitments on regulatory matters in areas other than services. The major disadvantage of PAs, 
however, is that their incorporation into the WTO must occur “exclusively by consensus” of the full 
membership, which greatly undermines the value of proceeding on a plurilaterial basis.  
For PAs to become a functional and feasible approach for advancing deeper regulatory cooperation 
at the WTO, Article X:9 of the WTO Agreement must be amended to no longer require approval of 
PAs by the full membership. In order secure the necessary support for that amendment, WTO 
members should also agree to a binding principles limiting the use of PAs. These principles should 
include assurances that non-signatories will not be compelled to adopt PAs at a later date. The 
principles should also provide that Members may join these agreements later with the same conditions 
that applied to the original signatories and require implementation support to be provided for least 
developed member countries (Lawrence, 2006). Requiring the creation of an observer status for non-
participating WTO members would also ensure the non-participating WTO members have full 
transparency and can raise concerns.  
The choice of topic for PAs should be member-state driven and reflect the need for interested 
governments to advance shared social preferences and efficient and effective regulatory oversight as 
part of global economic integration. This is most likely to occur in sectors that depend on 
internationally consistent, adequate, and efficient rules and standards for both freer trade and more 
effective regulatory oversight. These include goods and services sectors dominated by GVCs, such as 
automobiles, chemicals, and consumer goods (Bollyky, 2015). A particularly promising area is digital 
trade in goods and services, where regulatory paradigms in some countries are less entrenched and the 
adequacy and efficiency of global regulatory oversight in privacy, security, consumer protection, 
contract enforcement depends on international cooperation and consistency (Manyika et al., 2015; 
Metzler, 2015).  
The design of PAs should, of course, depend on the sector and the objectives for trade and 
regulatory cooperation. The WTO General Agreement on Trade Services (GATS) provides a 
potentially useful model for a rolling process of rule-making in a still novel area. The contribution of 
the GATS was to expand the coverage of services in the multilateral trading system but to do so in a 
way that afforded flexibility to countries undertaking new commitments.  
In the regulatory cooperation context, this approach might involve a baseline set of rules and a 
venue for engagement on regulatory transparency, information sharing, and explanations of new rules. 
The agreement should establish priorities and transparent procedures but otherwise be left broad, 
allowing member countries the flexibility to collaborate on emerging challenges. It might operate in a 
hub-and-spoke model and include voluntary, topic-specific, regulator-led working groups for 
interested members to negotiate deeper forms of regulatory cooperation. (Stewart, 2016) The hub, 
perhaps a Committee of participating member states with observer member states present, should: 
prepare common technical regulations and standards; recommend adoption of international standards; 
and promote the sharing of surveillance data and inspection reports through the development of 
confidentiality arrangements. The substance of these recommendations and proposals should be 
generated through the ad hoc, regulator-led working groups. These groups should be open to 
consultation with non-state actors and experts. The recommendations and proposals of the Committee 
should be made public and subject to notice and comment.
64
  
Maintaining the sovereignty and local accountability of national regulatory authorities will be 
essential to the success. Agreed upon regulatory cooperation measures should not have binding 
domestic legal effect. Thereby, where new legislation is required to implement such measures, 
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opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny is assured. Participating member states should, however, 
commit to decide on whether to adopt these joint recommendations within a fixed period of time and 
to provide a written, detailed explanation when deciding not to do so. Given the novelty of the 
regulatory coherence chapter and sensitivities around regulatory independence, subjecting the 
agreement to WTO dispute resolution would likely only discourage participation and inclusion of 
strong provisions in this area.  
4.2.3 Expanding Partnerships 
The state-to-state nature of WTO operations is increasingly outdated. Even a brief perusal of PTAs 
suffices for the reader to understand that a lot more is requested from business and civil society in this 
context. Public-private partnerships are now common in investment projects and in GVCs. The WTO 
needs to play a larger role in working with partners to create the broadly-supported governance 
frameworks that can advance international regulatory cooperation in the areas that most affect trade 
and investment (Hoekman, 2015). 
Regulatory cooperation is not the exclusive mandate of the WTO. Many other institutions, 
including the OECD, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, World Economic 
Forum, World Health Organization, and the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, are in this space and can take the lead in setting substantive norms. The World Bank, 
regional development banks, and donors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation are all 
supporting regulatory cooperation initiatives and might offer financial resources for capacity-building, 
policy dialogue, and monitoring here too.  
Greater engagement of the WTO with business organizations and civil society is particularly 
important. Firms participate in and manage GVCs, engage in private and nongovernmental 
international standard setting initiatives, and support corporate social responsibility and capacity 
building programs. Civil society, nongovernmental institutions, and academic institutions have 
expertise and the deep understanding of local circumstances to contribute agenda setting and ongoing 
problem solving.  
4.2.4 Multilateralizing Progress in PTAs 
The WTO needs a mechanism to ‘multilateralize’ the important regulatory cooperation that will 
inevitably happen in smaller clubs of like-minded countries, such as PTAs or regional economic 
communities.
65
 Multilateralizing that progress would reduce business costs, expand regulatory 
cooperation and the fulfillment of shared social preferences, and unlock the welfare benefits of trade 
liberalization in both the WTO and the PTAs.
66
 
One idea could be to initiate automatic negotiations any time a fixed number of countries belonging 
to the three distinct WTO groups (developed; developing; and least developed countries) entered into 
comparable arrangements on regulatory cooperation in separate agreements. Another idea would be to 
tie those automatic negotiations to the adoption of regulatory cooperation in a PTA covering a high 
percentage (such as eighty-five percent or more) of global trade in a goods or services sector.  
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Conclusion 
Can the WTO evolve? The institution remains a product of the post-World War II, Bretton Woods era, 
created by a coalition of powerful states, and vested with their authority to act as their agent in 
addressing well-defined coordination and governance problems emerging from their interdependence. 
Like many of its sister institutions from this era, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, the United Nations and its agencies such as the World Health Organization, the WTO has 
struggled as power dispersed to a greater number of states and non-state interests and broad-based 
consensus became harder to reach. It is no answer to state that the WTO will evolve because it must to 
survive. This has been true for many post-World War II era intergovernmental institutions for decades. 
Many have not and may never evolve. 
The emergence of GVCs, however, provides the WTO with an opportunity. In the sectors where 
this production model dominates, GVCs create a potential alignment of the interests of a wide 
diversity of states and non-state actors interested in freer trade, better regulation, and broader 
economic development. PTAs, standard setting organizations, and regulator-to-regulator initiatives are 
making important progress in advancing the international regulatory cooperation needed in the GVC 
era. That progress is limited, however, because these arrangements do not encompass the full range of 
countries in global commerce. 
This paper advocates changes in the corporate governance of the GATT/WTO to reflect the decline 
in tariffs and border restraints to commerce and the emerging challenges of advancing trade, 
regulation cooperation, and social preferences in a global economy dominated by GVCs. Together, 
these changes form a positive integration strategy that we refer to as the new WTO Think. This 
strategy remains rooted in the original rationale of the GATT (or GATT-think) of reducing the 
negative externalities of unilateral action and solving important international coordination challenges, 
but is more inclusive of regulators and non-state actors and more flexible and positive in its means. In 
particular, the WTO should embrace the confluence of shared social preferences and trade, where it 
exists, as a motivation for advancing international regulatory cooperation. It should multilateralize the 
important regulatory cooperation occurring in smaller clubs of like-minded countries and adopt 
changes to facilitate the use of PAs where agreement across all WTO members is not yet possible. 
While making these corporate governance changes will not be easy, they are feasible. There are 
precedents to draw upon from the Tokyo Round codes. The GATS and, more recently, the EGA 
negotiations offer potential lessons for other tackling other regulatory cooperation changes at the 
WTO.  
GVCs provide an opportunity for the WTO to evolve, but it is time-limited. As GVCs become less 
inclusive and more regional in nature, reaching consensus among the relevant actors will only become 
harder. The time to act is now. 
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